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I.  INTRODUCTION 
I thank the PSDE for inviting me to deliver this plenary lecture at its 20th 
AGM belatedly honouring the memory of a personal friend and colleague, Jawaid 
Azfar, who passed away more than twenty years ago. Jawaid’s premature demise 
robbed Pakistan of one of its most promising economists and planners and created a 
vacuum in the intellectual leadership of Pakistan’s once proud economic planning 
and management team, which  is still a gaping hole. Jawaid Azfar  received his 
academic training in economics at Cambridge and Harvard Universities and his 
doctorate dissertation on income distribution in Pakistan was a seminal piece of work 
which inspired many other studies focusing on aspects of equity which were ignored 
by the earlier planners in Pakistan.
1 My own two studies on poverty in Pakistan 
published in the 1970s benefited greatly from the methodology and insights of his 
study.
2  While teaching at the Quaid-i-Azam University, I worked as a Consultant to 
the Planning Commission on  macroeconomic model building, in close collaboration 
and almost daily interaction with him. Jawaid also agreed to my request to help in 
teaching courses at the University and acted as an external examiner on many 
occasions.  Jawaid was a quiet, shy person whose low-key manner concealed his 
considerable intellectual depth. He died tragically at a young age of stroke due to 
extreme pressure of work imposed on him by his many demanding bosses who relied 
on his expertise to push their own self-serving agendas during the first half of Gen. 
Ziaul Haq’s 11-year military rule.  
Delving into the contrafactual, which I intend to indulge in later in the context 
of today’s topic, I am sure if he were alive today,  Jawaid, who was had the 
designation only of an Acting Chief Economist of the Planning Commission at the 
time of his death,  would have  not only become a leading figure in economic 
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management in Pakistan, but would have significantly influenced policy-making 
away from some of the disastrous policy mistakes undertaken after his demise, in his 
own unobtrusive way. 
Before concluding my prefatory remarks, I must thank the Pakistan 
Society of Development Economists for bestowing me this honour, despite the 
fact that I have never formally become its member. I am sure all of you would 
agree that the PSDE has done a yeoman’s service to the Pakistani economics 
profession in the last two decades in organising these meetings, with utmost 
regularity. Professor Nawab Haider Naqvi, who initiated them, has earned our 
eternal gratitude for his wisdom and foresight in conceiving and turning them 
into an inescapable annual event  in the rather officially-loaded Islamabad 
calendar and his successors have admirably tried to uphold the tradition.  My 
only real disenchantment with the PSDE has been that it has, perhaps, 
unwittingly, supplanted the Pakistan Economic Association as an independent 
and representative  professional association of economists.  
In a period when  there is a premium on dissent and  need for questioning the 
direction of economic policy, the role of such an organisation can not be 
overstressed.  Unfortunately, since the birth of PSDE, the Pakistan Economic 
Association went into a comatose state, largely due to collective apathy. Some of us 
in the profession have repeatedly tried to resuscitate it, without any success. I hope 
that a broader and more concerted effort, especially by younger economists, would 
prove much more fruitful. I am sure that both PIDE and PSDE will see no challenge 
in the revival of a representative professional body of economists. In fact, I see rich 
externalities and complementarities emerging between the two to benefit the 
profession as a whole. I do hope my remarks will not be taken as in any way 
disparaging the stellar contribution of PSDE in creating and keeping alive the 
excellent tradition that it has built in the last 20 years. However, I do want the debate 
on economic and social issues to be broadened and conducted in a way that only a 
representative national economic association can and which an adjunct body of PIDE 
can not. 
I intend to share with you some thoughts on the pattern of   economic growth 
and  development in South Asia and how it has been impacted by and on the degree 
of economic cooperation among the countries of the region, the prospects for which 
have recently generated considerable fond hype, though not enough robust hope.  
The backdrop of this discourse is the  unfolding thaw in the political relations of the 
region’s two largest economies which have slowly started to move towards a degree 
of sanity and sobriety, without as yet showing much promise of normality or 
rationality.  The decision-makers in both countries still seem to be driven more by 
the compulsions of domestic politics rather than by the potentials of regional 
economics which could usher in an era of new prosperity and hope for around a third 
of humanity and half of the world’s poor who inhabit this region.  Growth and Development in South Asia  399
Although there is a danger of raising the level of expectations about the on-
going inter-governmental talks between India and Pakistan, which can result in 
serious disappointment as only modest results can be achieved in the face of existing 
ground realities and the limited vision of the political leadership in both countries, it 
is essential not to lose sight of the opportunities in store and to analyse the causes of 
those that have been missed in the past. The most serious impediment in achieving 
even a modest degree of improvement in the presently dismal state of Indo-Pakistan 
relationship is the high level of misunderstanding and misperceptions that the public 
opinion in each country has about the problems facing the other. The purpose of my 
talk this afternoon is to fathom the apprehensions and misperceptions that underlie 
Pakistan’s apparent reluctance  and lack of enthusiasm in tangoing with India in a 
South Asian development ensemble whose pace may be orchestrated largely by 
India’s economic growth and dynamism. At the same time, I will try to put in a 
historical perspective India’s apprehensions, especially in the past, about Pakistan’s 
credibility as a South Asian team player.  These apprehensions need to be overcome 
if the South Asian dream of ridding the region of its extreme poverty and becoming 
an economic power house is to be realised.  
I shall use four basic building blocks to conceptualise my presentation. First I 
will survey the growth performance of South Asian countries, especially since the 
1990s when serious efforts began to be made to promote regional cooperation in 
South Asia as a means of fostering its development and accelerating its growth.   
The second building block is the historical legacy that links these countries 
and is often a source of discord than unity among them. The challenge for South 
Asian nations is not that they should forget that history but that they should develop 
an understanding about the evolution of culture and society on the subcontinent 
through objective research and based on respect for various religious and social 
groups that have lived in it and have contributed to its development and splendour. 
The term “enlightened moderation” does not need to be restricted to the relations 
between Western and Eastern cultures, but also needs to be applied to relations 
among various religions and cultures which thrive in South Asia. Even more 
importantly, history need not be viewed simply as a clash of religions and cultures, 
but needs to be interpreted in terms of its economic and social dimensions as well.  
The third building block is the geopolitics of South Asian countries and their 
linkages with other regions, including those outside Asia. Geopolitics has played a 
major role in shaping regional and sub-regional alliances. Here again the challenge is 
to turn geopolitics into a vehicle of development, rather than rent-seeking.  
The fourth and final building block is a look a contrafactual  exercise to see 
“what might have been” if regional cooperation in South Asia had been more pro-
active than it has been. 
In a concluding section, I try to present the future possibilities of regional 
cooperation in South Asia and its likely impact on its growth and development.  S. M. Naseem  400
II.  ECONOMIC GROWTH IN INDIA AND PAKISTAN 
 
The Growth Race vs. the Arms Race 
In the beginning of the first half of the half-century of post-colonial 
development, the development race in Asia was pretty wide open, like a long-
distance marathon. Countries just freed from the colonial yoke were beginning to 
prepare themselves to climb the peaks of development. South Asian countries which 
started a bit early in the race were generally considered to be ahead of others, some 
of whom were still engaged in civil wars and were recovering from the ravages of 
the Second World War and the Japanese occupation which had affected them 
directly.  
The British did not want to fight a pitched battle before being driven home in 
the declining days of their Empire, although they left plenty of political land mines 
which India and Pakistan are struggling to clear more than half a century after they 
left. To be fair, they also left a considerable legacy of institutional and physical 
infrastructure which gave South Asia some edge in the development race. 
Unfortunately, except for the Army, which in the view of many, became 
overdeveloped in time, especially in Pakistan, that legacy soon either fell into 
disrepair or became inadequate partly due to the short-sightedness of its political 
èlite and partly as a result of rapid population growth.  As a result, the head start that 
South Asia had was soon dissipated and South Asian nations started to recede 
towards the back of the pack in the development marathon.  
By 1960s the South Asian nations, intoxicated from their early development 
successes, seemed to have lost their concentration on development goals and became  
involved in the cold war and the arms race, which even more adversely affected their 
development. On the other hand, East and South-east Asia, whose chances of doing 
well in the beginning were highly discounted began to leap forward. Even more 
significantly, they started linking themselves both politically—through ASEAN and 
later APEC—and economically, through what came to be known as the “flying 
geese” model of development, which enabled a lagging economy to replace the one 
ahead of it in terms of lower labour-intensity.
3  
South Asian economies started their development journey, more or less as 
closed economies. The now much-maligned import-substitution strategy was 
practically the only option available at a time when they started to industrialise in an 
effort to raise per capita incomes of their population. Most of them, especially 
undivided Pakistan, were  exporters of primary commodities, especially industrial 
raw materials and importers of industrial products. Some, like Sri Lanka,  whose 
primary commodity exports were buoyant, continued to flourish without significant 
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import-substituting industrialisation. India, which already had a modest industrial 
base even in colonial times, suffered as neighbouring countries raised their tariff 
walls to promote import-substitution.  By the 1970s, the international environment 
was changing in favour of export-oriented, rather than import-substituting 
industrialisation.  
The success of the East Asian Newly Industrialising Economies (NIEs) and 
later China in achieving double digit growth rates through export-led 
industrialisation, in which Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) played a key role,   
changed the Asian development paradigm and the world waited with baited breath 
the emergence of a new Asian tiger every few years. Unfortunately, a South Asian 
tiger never emerged from the jungle of bureaucratic files and politicians’ rent-
seeking activities.  To extend the metaphor,  a possible reason for the absence of 
South Asian tigers was that although South Asia’s geographical territory was much 
larger than of Southeast Asia and East Asia, there was much more freedom for the 
tigers in the latter to roam around.  The differential in growth rates of the two sets of 
economies can partly be attributed to this freedom, which can be taken as a surrogate 
for regional cooperation.  Another special feature of the East and South East Asian 
countries was their pragmatic and deliberate combination of state action and the use 
of the market economy in a consistent manner through their development process. In 
South Asia, however, the pendulum between state intervention and private enterprise 
swung erratically midway during their development process. Whereas regional 
cooperation in East and Southeast Asia was driven largely by private enterprise, in 
South Asia the Governments played a much larger role in determining the terms of 
regional endearment.   
The relative performance of the economies of the three large and 
geographically contiguous countries, China, India and Pakistan, which have had a 
history of fluctuating relationships among them, has attracted considerable attention 
in recent years.  While, at least since the late 1950s, Pakistan has enjoyed a long 
period of friendship and cooperation and  India has had a rather bitter rivalry with 
China since 1962  until the recent thaw in Sino-Indian  relations, both countries have 
envied the tremendous development in China, particularly its impressive and 
uninterrupted growth record for over two decades. 
Pakistan and India have also been, apart from their debilitating political and 
military confrontation over the years, engaged in a see-saw  tortoise-hare economic 
race, which the Indian tortoise seems to be  winning in the last decade. In 2003, for 
the first time in decades, India’s per capita income overtook Pakistan’s and India 
seems poised to leap forward. Pakistan’s economic growth which was in a state of 
free fall in 2000, was stabilised after a three-year PRGF agreement with IMF, but has 
yet to resume its dynamic growth trajectory. The programme has not had any 
significant impact on poverty reduction which rose sharply in the 1990s and has 
increased economic inequalities and social tensions. However, the growth experience S. M. Naseem  402
of both India and Pakistan are qualitatively quite different from that of China and 
both South Asian countries have a long way to go, both in terms of the growth 
trajectory itself and the quality of growth generated by it.  
The trajectories of growth of India and Pakistan have been markedly different. 
Pakistan’s growth has mainly been in spurts, rather than following a steady path. The 
two periods of high growth, averaging over 6 percent in GDP and over 3 percent in 
GDP per capita terms,  occurred in the 1960s and 1980s. In the 1970s and 1990s, the 
rate of GDP per capita growth was less than 1.5 percent, despite some lowering in 
the population growth rate in the 1990s. The Indian GDP per capita growth rate, 
though low, was fairly steady around 3 percent, with the exception of 1970s when it 
fell below 1 percent. After three decades of slow if perceptible progress 
(characterised as the period of “Hindu growth rate”), India’s growth rate accelerated 
to 5-6 percent in the late 1970s, and has apparently stayed there—though the more 
optimistic estimates believe it has passed the 7-8 percent mark. The detailed history 
is a bit more complex with periods of thrust and retreat reflecting not only the 
uncertain nature of the weather but also the impact of the Korean war boom in the 
early 1950s, and of the ‘green revolution’ in later 1960s, on the positive side and the 
bad harvests of the late 1950s, the financial crisis of 1991, and the reallocation of 
resources from development to defence in the early 1960s, as part of the reaction to 
the 1962 war with China. In contrast, the Chinese growth rate, which was already 
averaging 4 percent in the 1970s, rose to 7.8 percent in 1980s and 9.0 percent in the 
1990s. China has thus consistently stayed in a higher growth trajectory, well above 
those of either India or Pakistan. (See the Figure below). 
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Pakistan’s predicament is far more serious than of India’s, as it has failed to 
pay attention to the basic fundamentals of growth in the past five decades and has 
only sporadically responded to the challenges facing it. Its greater dependence on 
external flows has greatly diminished its domestic capacity to deal with its domestic 
problems. Its hare-like obsession with faster growth and leapfrogging has ironically 
resulted in its recent  lack lustre performance. It needs a sustained period of attention 
and diversion of resources to sectors which have been neglected in the past and a 
greater effort to tax those who have benefited from the rent-seeking policies of the 
past. It also needs to pay heed to the unfinished agenda of development, especially 
land reforms and mobilisation of domestic savings, as well as the nagging and 
unresolved issue of civilian supremacy over defence and security issues. 
Although it is generally agreed that Pakistan’s performance in social 
development has lagged behind other countries at the same level of per capita 
income, its structural  economic weaknesses are less well-recognised.  Pakistan has 
been stuck at the early stage of development where land is abundant relative to 
physical capital and ownership of the land is highly concentrated. Although the share 
of agriculture in GDP has declined from 50 percent to 22 percent, the percentage  of 
labour force employed in agriculture is still high (close to half the labour force 
remains employed in agriculture). In the 1990s the share of mining and large-scale 
manufacturing in total employment fell from 12.88 percent in 1990 to 10.55 percent 
in 2000. The large-scale manufacturing sector has not only declined as a percentage 
of GDP, a phenomenon called “deindustrialisation”, the growth of manufacturing 
sector has been concentrated in a small sub-sector of industries, accounting for less 
than 10 percent of the gross value added (GVA) generated in the large-scale 
manufacturing sector. 
Since the 1970s India has been slowly but steadily liberalising its economy. 
This is evidenced by greater freedom to invest; more liberal access to foreign 
exchange; greater openness to foreign competition and investment, particularly after 
the financial crisis of 1991; and perhaps a greater willingness of the government to 
work with some private sector firms after the late 1970s (although the government 
worked with some business groups in the 1950s and 1960s.)  
There has been a heated debate about the reasons for ‘India shining’ relate to 
what happened to growth, with two polarised views. The neo-liberal view  is that the 
primary thrust came from liberalisation  without which growth could not 
have  been  sustained, especially after 1991  the other, the neo-Nehruvian view is 
that  the general fostering attitude of government  continues to be a major 
factor, and that liberalisation  played  only a supporting role. However, as Dr 
Manmohan Singh has told his economic advisers recently that “2004 is not 1991” 
and that  decision-makers will need to take political ground realities into account and  
get adjusted to the demands of a coalition government, which is critically dependent 
upon the support of the Left parties. S. M. Naseem  404
A feature of India’s recent growth is that it is concentrated in a few sectors and 
regions. Since the mid-1990s the information technology sector has experienced 
explosive growth; sales have increased twelvefold since 1995-96. This growth has had an 
impact, but IT accounts for less than 3 percent of national income.  Thus it might explain 
0.2-0.3 percent of the annual growth. Among other sectors, growth in consumer durables 
consumption and production has  been disproportionate. Automobile sales are up 12 
times, scooters six times, and commercial vehicle sales have doubled since 1981. Even 
bicycle sales have more than doubled. Middle class housing has expanded significantly, 
though figures on the housing construction sector are not readily available. Interestingly, 
per capita availability of cotton cloth stagnated while the availability of man-made fibre 
doubled. The bulk of the growth has been in industries producing for the domestic 
market, though exports have remained buoyant. Thus the main beneficiary of the 
resurgence in Indian growth has been the affluent middle classes, with some trickle down 
to the lower middle class as well. But the wider, bulkier underclass of rural workers and 
low-productivity urban-informal sector workers, seem to have shared little of the luster of 
“India shining”.  In contrast, in Pakistan, where the degree of exclusion of the underclass 
is greater and the income inequality much higher, the slowdown in growth in recent years 
has affected the poor much more and the poverty incidence seems to have increased, 
despite some acceleration in the growth rate in the last two years. 
 
III.  THE HISTORICAL LEGACY 
How does the pace and pattern of growth impinge on regional cooperation in 
South Asia. Two historical facts need to be recognised in this regard.  First, that prior to 
1947, South Asia, particularly, the Indian subcontinent, was already an integrated 
economic region. However, there was little growth during the pre-independence period.  
Second, prior to the establishment of SAARC in 1985, there was little 
enthusiasm in India about regional cooperation. SAARC was initiated by smaller 
countries, especially Bangladesh, to benefit from the possibilities of regional 
economic cooperation as evidenced by the success of ASEAN. 
The complex nature of regional co-operation in South Asia, which has been 
highlighted by the snail’s pace at which it has moved since it was formally put on the 
table over two decades ago, makes it essential to take a longer look at history. The 
tortured history of the relationships—derived from the many versions of its 
narrative—among the peoples and states which have formed part of the sub-
continent and its distorted memories have continued to vitiate the process of 
emergence of a viable fabric of regional co-operation. 
 
1.  Pre-colonial Era  
One of the great tragedies of social science research in Pakistan has been the 
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access to readily available historical literature on Pakistan, might well wonder what 
happened to the country’s heritage between the fifth and second half of the twentieth 
century. There is precious little that the visitor would find to enlighten him about 
what happened during this period as an explanation of how we have arrived at the 
present state of our historical journey after the ancestors of some of its present 
inhabitants embraced Islam 1500 years ago. In India, things are considerably better 
at least in terms of the volume of historical research, although it also remains 
obsessed with the religious orientation of the majority of its people. However, there 
seems to be a resurgence of interest in historical research and an attempt to 
understand its past as a guide to the future aspirations of its people. Academics like 
Amartya Sen and Eric Hobsbawm draw large crowds in metropolitan centres 
lecturing on history and relating it to the solution of the social and economic 
problems facing the country and the world at large.
4 
Although the history of the sub-continent is very long, the events pertinent to 
the current discussion are the various interactions of the sub-continental economies 
and cultures dating back to the last millennium. Unfortunately, so far the focus on 
these interactions have been largely on their political and religious aspects, while the 
economic and developmental aspects have largely been neglected and have begun to 
be explored only recently. A deeper understanding of these interactions is likely to 
lead to a more profound perception of the possibilities and impediments to regional 
cooperation in South Asia. 
The two defining  episodes of this era are the various Muslim incursions from 
the North in the first half of the millennium, beginning with the raids of Mahmud 
Ghaznavi and ending with the decline of the Mughal empire and the various Western 
imperialist attacks on the sub-continent heralded by the arrival of the British, French, 
Dutch and Portuguese maritime commercial interests in the second half of the 
millennium and ending with the demise of the colonial rule and the establishment of 
two independent nation states, India and Pakistan. 
Contemporary discussions of the historical evolution of globalisation have 
concentrated on the international movement of capital from the metropolis to the 
periphery in the transformation of the global economy through increased 
international independence based on the Ricardian principle of comparative 
advantage. However, the much more nuanced process of integration of the Indian 
sub-continent with the world economy through the interventions of the two major 
interactive episodes (the Muslim and the Western) mentioned earlier, have received 
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much less attention as sub-themes of globalisation and regionalisation in the sub-
continent.  
For instance, the period from 1000 AD to 1300 AD saw an upward swing of 
the economy of Gujrat the area which was partly as a result of the opening up of the 
trade with West Asia and the interest that the ruling Chaulukyas took in promoting 
such trade. This was the period of the immediate aftermath of the most intensive 
invasions by Mahmoud Ghaznavi including the alleged twelve attacks on the temple 
in Somnath. Trade provided impetus to agricultural improvements through systems 
of irrigation in the drought-prone hinterland. Road links between rural areas and  
markets were established which not only reduced transportation costs but also 
provided better administration and security. The success of maritime trade was also 
enhanced by the presence of extraordinarily wealthy ship-owning merchants, often 
known as nakhudas or nauvittakas, coming from diverse national origins, such as 
Persian, Arab, Jewish and Indian and located in such diverse places as Hormuz, 
Siraf, Aden and Mangalore. They commanded the seas and defied the pirates who 
were a menace to the trade.
5   
The period from the ninth to the fifteenth century A.D.  was one in which 
Western India enjoyed a conspicuously wealthy trade with ports along the Arabian 
Sea and the Persian Gulf. According to visiting traders, the land was rich in its 
resources and its merchants traded widely.
6 Marco Polo comments in the ninth 
century that the people of Somanatha lived by trade and that the trade in horses from 
Hormuz was very valuable. Horses of quality were not bred in India and were 
imported from Central Asia via the north-western passes or by sea from the Persian 
Gulf. The commercial centres of Gujrat became closely linked with the hinterland 
and internal trade, along with maritime trade with West Asia and overland trade 
through Central Asia, contributed to the creation of wealth, making Gujrat a truly 
globalised economy.
7 
Contrary to popular perceptions, trade introduced flexibility in relations 
between different religious groups. Hindu merchants had mosques constructed for 
their trading partners in Hormuz. Even if it was motivated to enhance commercial 
profit, the underlying spirit of solidarity was impressive. The accommodative and 
obliging environment towards Muslim merchants induced many of them, especially 
those from the Sunni dissident Bohra and Khoja communities to settle down 
permanently in Gujrat, where they have been peacefully living and carrying their 
business for almost a thousand years, until shaken by the partition and the  recent 
riots in Ahmedabad. The Arab interest shifted from dominance in the initial phase to 
participation and active involvement in the local economy in the later phase. At the 
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same time, Indian merchants had bases in the entrepots of the Gulf and merchants 
from there visited India. 
Unfortunately, both Muslims and Hindus (and their protagonists in 
contemporary India and Pakistan) have grossly failed to realise the economic and 
social significance of this evolutionary process of the formation of a regional 
economy and have painted it purely as a struggle for the supremacy of one religion 
over the other. The raid of the temple in Somnath by Mahmud Ghaznavi in 1026 AD 
has often been exaggeratedly treated as a “foundational event” of the Hindu-Muslim 
divide and has been celebrated in Persian (not Arabic) as “epics of conquest” and in 
Hindi (not Sanskrit) as “epics of resistance”.
8 In fact, detailed research of different 
sources spanning the period since the occurrence of the event has shown that these 
conventional interpretations “obscure and deny the nuances” and tend to perceive the 
event “largely in terms of relationships between courts and the antagonisms between 
Hindus and Muslims”.
9  
The encounter was, in fact, much more complex and multi-layered and 
evolved over a period of centuries, much more through mutual respect and tolerance 
for, and often an implicit adoption of, each other’s cultural values, history and modes 
of behaviour, than through a state of permanent armed conflict among indigenous 
and alien communities, as is often brought out in chauvinistic versions of history in 
both countries. As pointed out by the leading historian of medieval India, Romila 
Thapar, “That societies and cultures frequently mould the religions that they choose 
to follow and that every religion has a historical root in the society where it has a 
following and that its evolution draws upon multiple religions and societies was a 
perspective unfamiliar to historians until recent times”.  That is a perspective not 
only historians, but also economists and other social scientists need to acquire and 
disseminate if real peace and regional cooperation is to gain a firm founding. 
Insistence on purist and textual interpretations of religions does great injustice not 
only to the societies which adopt them, but also to the religions themselves and their 
resilience over centuries. 
 
2.  The Colonial Interlude 
The debate about the effects of the British colonial rule in India continues to 
rage and perceptions about its legacy, both positive and negative, have changed over 
time. In the present age of globalisation, one of the perceived benefits is the facility 
with which a large section of its population has acquired command over the English 
language, which has helped it to access the benefits of modernisation, technological 
progress and better integration with the outside world. Earlier, bleaker perceptions 
had focused on the possibility of India having been robbed of the opportunity of an 
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incipient Industrial Revolution through the destruction of a wide range of 
industries.
10   
The colonial occupation of the subcontinent, spanning over two centuries, was 
“the complete but complex integration and enmeshing of the colony with the world 
capitalist system in a subordinate or subservient position”.
11 The colonial legacy 
largely conditioned the evolution of economic policies by the two successor states 
after independence, especially in regard to the opening up of the economy to the 
outside world. Indian industry and markets were extensively exploited by British 
foreign direct investment and the nascent Indian capitalist class was subject to 
serious economic and political constraints which subverted its growth.
12 The colonial 
strategy of enclave-focused development also neglected the development of many of 
the areas, particularly those that later became part of Pakistan. The colonial industrial 
structure was primarily created for  utilising the natural resource base of the Indian 
economy for the purpose of promoting the British industries and providing them with 
the vast Indian market. These factors militated against not only the welcoming of 
foreign direct investment in the post-independence era, but also provided a strong 
rationale for across the board import-substitution in both India and Pakistan. The de 
facto customs union that existed between India and Pakistan also suddenly collapsed 
in the wake of Pakistan’s decision not to devalue its currency in sync with the British 
pound and the Indian rupee in 1949, both countries preferring aggressive nationalism 
to economic rationality.
13  The rest, one may say, is history. 
The colonial legacy proved even more harmful in fanning the fires of 
communalism and in exacerbating the hatred among Hindus and Muslims, which 
continued to sour the relationship between India and Pakistan, although the purpose 
of creating the two states was primarily to defuse that animosity and to allow the two 
communities  to live peacefully. Returning to the Somnath episode, the way in which 
it was used by the British to revive an almost forgotten historical event, eight 
centuries after it had occurred, illustrates how the colonialists  used it to serve their 
own ends of rolonging their reign and sowing the seeds of discord which continued 
to produce bitter harvests long after they have left. The linking of Somnath with 
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Babri Masjid through a BJP rath yatra in 1990, the destruction of the Babri mosque 
in 1992, sparking communal riots all over the subcontinent and culminating in the 
Gujrat pogroms of 2002 were echoes of Governor-General Lord Ellenborough’s 
1842 Proclamation to dig deep into by then 800-year old Somnath Temple affair.  
However, the motivations of this Proclamation were far more sordid than 
appeared on the surface. Ostensibly trying to right the wrong perceived to have been 
perpetrated by Muslim invaders and triggered by the need to force the return of the 
missing gates of the temple allegedly taken as a trophy and found in Afghanistan, the 
Proclamation was really intended to provide the seal of dualistic determinism to the 
Hindu-Muslim divide, which was nurtured by the communal politics of the 1920s 
and subsequent years. Before leaving India, the British had prepared the ground for 
the reconstruction of the Somnath Temple and an influential British historian had 
stated: ‘It is the sacred duty of new and renascent India to reconsecrate Somnatha 
and try to restore its former glory and splendour’. Among the prominent Indian 
nationalists, K. M. Munshi, argued forcefully for the reconstruction of the Somnath 
temple which was completed soon after independence. “ .. for a thousand years 
Mahmud’s destruction of the shrine has been burnt into the sub-conscious of the 
[Hindu] race, as an unforgettable national disaster”.  
The Proclamation also provided  a pretext to the British invasion of and 
hegemony over Afghanistan, as it was beginning to be realised that the real danger to 
the British was the shifting of the centre of gravity of geopolitics to Central Asia 
with Afghanistan as the epicentre and with the possible connivance of Czarist 
Russia. Historical research was also veering from emphasising the main motivation 
of Mahmud Ghaznavi’s attacks as a religious enterprise to that of plundering India to 
finance the Central Asian empire. 
Ironically, Muslims became their own worst enemies by exaggerating the 
Ghaznavid plunder and sacrilege of Somnath in their zeal to establish the superiority 
of their religion and in their disdain against idolatry. Since there were no authentic 
accounts available from Hindu sources to corroborate those by Muslim historians or 
narrators, which are often contradictory, the latter not only gained currency and 
credibility, but were embellished further by Hindus to strengthen the perception of 
Muslim religious intolerance and persecution.
14 A vicious circle of false claim and its 
further embellishment by the aggrieved to exaggerate the undeniable and 
indefensible event provided a powerful instrument to widen the Hindu-Muslim 
divide, whenever it proved convenient to those benefiting from it.  
I mention only one significant historical episode around which so much of the 
misunderstanding between the two communities that have interacted with each other 
over the past millennium continues to exist, despite their decision to form separate 
states on the basis of the majority of population in each of them.  There are countless 
others which are only recently beginning to be addressed by the saner historians of 
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the two countries. It is essential that the cobwebs of these collective memories, 
constructed on false historiography, are removed in both communities and countries 
and attention is shifted to more relevant and pressing social and economic needs that 
they have suffered from a common colonial legacy. History and memory need to be 
recovered by both Hindus and Muslims, as well as by India and Pakistan in a 
constructive way and not to distort and telescope unrelated events to create divisive 
communal, sectarian and ethnic hatreds. Perhaps, the initiative will have to be taken 
by scholars and academics of both countries to disabuse the historiography of the 
subcontinent at least of some of the blatant untruths which have continued to poison 
the minds of ordinary people and have stood in the way of genuine reconciliation and 
regional cooperation.  
 
IV.  THE GEOPOLITICS OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 
Geopolitics has played a pivotal role in South Asian development and regional 
cooperation. In the first five years of its existence, Pakistan was divided into two 
geographical segments separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. India was a 
much more compact and governable, if linguistically and culturally a more diverse, 
geographical entity, except for Kashmir whose borders with Pakistan became the 
source of a festering dispute soon after independence. Pakistan’s eastern half and 
India’s northliest state required massive troop movements and eyeball to eyeball 
confrontation along these borders. External alliances became a hostage to these 
abnormal geographic situations, with India and Pakistan cozying up to rival cold war 
camps, albeit with a distance. The situation became even more complicated after the 
Sino-Indian border dispute and the Sino-Soviet ideological split. This further 
precluded any meaningful economic interaction involving the two major South Asian 
countries in a bilateral or regional framework. This was clearly to the detriment of 
economic growth of both countries, particularly to Pakistan’s eastern wing, which 
eventually became independent and revived its trade and economic links with India.   
In the post-Bangladesh period, Pakistan’s geographic position became even 
more salient after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US military support to 
the Mujahideens, both directly and through the Pakistani Government. Pakistan 
became an enviable geo-strategic location at the cross-roads of the subcontinent, the 
Persian Gulf, and Central Asia. Pakistan’s military rulers have become deft at putting 
geography to maximum political use in the short-run, an ability which has 
outsmarted the politicians and has kept the Army in saddle, despite military fiascos. 
The thin strip of territory on Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan became a highly 
strategic  piece of real estate for the West, which allowed Pakistan to leverage its 
economic and political  influence, especially over the United States. Its importance 
has become further enhanced since 9/11. However, extracting political benefits from 
geography has yielded diminishing returns since  the end of  the Cold War and has 
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blunted the instruments used by the Pakistani state to achieve political goals, both at 
home and abroad—permissiveness towards, if not overt support of,  religious 
fundamentalism and covert violence.  The strategic importance of Pakistan’s geo-
political location will be further eroded once the United States has achieved its 
currently perceived goals and has decided to withdraw from the region.  
Pakistan’s preoccupation with its strategic and geopolitical assets has resulted 
in putting the effective development and utilisation of its vast natural and human 
assets on a back burner. As Professor Stephen Cohen has remarked in his recent 
book,  “In summary, the human material is there to turn Pakistan into a modern state, 
but it has been systematically squandered for three generations by an èlite persuaded 
that Pakistan’s critical strategic location would be enough to get through difficult 
times. Now, the distant future has arrived, with Pakistan unequipped to face a fast-
changing world while coping with mounting domestic problems”.
15 The temptation 
to cash in on this strategic asset once again after the 9/11 events was too great for 
any Government to resist. But it is unlikely to be a viable long-run strategy of 
development or modernisation, “enlightened” or otherwise. 
As the South Asian region’s big brother, overseeing its large land and coastal 
borders—whose vulnerability to natural disasters, in addition to gunboats, was 
tragically demonstrated recently,   India’s use of geopolitics to achieve political and 
economic objectives, is more problematic and costly. Its ambitions to be a world, not 
merely a regional, power may seem justifiable to itself and its increasing number of 
admirers in the West, but many in South Asia would consider this as premature and 
counterproductive to regional cooperation. It would be much more in the interest of 
India and South Asia, if India concentrated more on its growing economic muscles, 
coping with its vast social and economic problems, further strengthening its 
democratic polity and showing greater magnanimity in its relations with 
neighbours—all of which would add to its credentials as a world power and would 
help transform the region it is most closely identified with. India’s recognition as a 
world power would then become a formality, rather than a controversy. 
In the new era of globalisation which South Asian countries seem keen to 
benefit from, geopolitics still plays a useful role in their growth and 
development. The present thaw in Indo-Pakistan relations  which is now almost a 
year old, did not occur suddenly, but began through a gradual realisation that 
trade and investment, rather than arms race and military confrontation, are the 
ways to go for both.   Pakistani ruling circles  are beginning to realise that the 
country has the  geographical advantage to  become a “bridge state” that will link 
the Subcontinent, the Gulf and Central Asia in beneficial flows of trade, 
commerce and energy, rather than being preoccupied with blocking the door to  
India’s entry into that region or using it as a leverage to force the solution of the 
Kashmir problem. This thinking was reflected in a meeting of Pakistani 
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diplomats convened in Islamabad in mid 2003, six months ahead of the 12th 
SAARC Summit in Islamabad and was forcefully articulated by Pakistan’s UN 
Representative, Munir Akram, who reportedly declared that opening road and 
rail links as well as transit trade with India would significantly expand Pakistan’s 
strategic options. The Indian side has constantly commended to Pakistan the use 
of the “China model”, where New Delhi and Beijing have dramatically expanded 
their economic cooperation while continuing to manage and minimise their huge 
political differences. While the two countries have agreed to adopt a long-term 
view on most other disputes, Pakistan seems eager to get the Kashmir issue 
resolved presumably within the term of the present Government. 
Trade was not an element of the national strategy in South Asia; the 
limited foreign exchange requirements were met by external economic 
assistance. In the case of Pakistan, massive aid flowed from the strategic 
alliances it carved out with the United States and China, mainly because of its 
geographic location. Although in recent years Pakistan has tried to reduce its 
dependence on foreign borrowing and has made some efforts to raise its export 
targets, its trade/GDP ratio has stagnated at around 35 percent,  while the same 
ratio has risen significantly for all SAARC member countries between 1985 and 
2001, with India’s ratio doubling from 14.08 percent in 1985-87 to 29.79 percent 
in 2000-2001 (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Proportion of Trade in the GDP of South Asian Countries 
(In Percent) 
Year Bangladesh  Bhutan  India  Maldives  Nepal  Pakistan  Sri  Lanka 
1985-87 24.26  61.25  14.08  60.26  31.91  34.01  61.87 
1990-92 19.83  75.05  18.78  88.51  36.28  37.45  68.42 
1996-98 30.47  76.15  25.45  167.08  59.59  36.40  79.17 
2000-2001 35.50  89.47  29.79  168.94  55.06  35.84  85.42 
Source: South Asia Development and Cooperation Report, 2004 (RIS, New Delhi). 
 
Nearly a decade ago, when India launched its economic reforms, geopolitics 
began to be given a back seat to economics and commerce by New Delhi’s South 
Block. Trade began to be valued more in New Delhi than aid. The former Indian  
Finance Minister, Jaswant Singh announced he will not accept foreign aid that comes 
in small doses. The former  External Affairs Minister, Yashwant  Sinha, negotiated 
free trade agreements with regions as far apart as Latin America, Africa and South 
East Asia. Pakistan, where the Foreign Office still rules the roost over external 
economic relations in  which it reflexively follows India’s lead, belatedly sent its 
President and Prime Minister on a similar mission recently. The search for capital, 
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over the last decade. This explains India’s keenness to form a South Asian trading 
bloc and a South Asian Economic Community and even a common currency—
although there  it may be jumping the gun a bit. 
This was not so, a couple of decades earlier. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
Mrs Gandhi had opposed the formation of SAARC on the apprehension that it was 
nothing but an attempt by the smaller countries of the region to “gang up” against 
India, possibly under the instigation of an unfriendly Pakistan. It was not until later, by 
when India had decisively changed gears of its external economic policy in favour of a 
more export-oriented growth, that it developed its fondness for SAARC and took some 
tentative measures to woo the other countries to expand the scope of the organisation 
beyond its limited initial agenda, which included promoting exchange of visits, 
information and experience-activities. However, Pakistan, which was always 
apprehensive about India taking a leading role in the region in view of its past wars and 
the unsettled Kashmir dispute, continued to show its lack of enthusiasm about 
collaborating with India on South Asian economic issues. Its main interest in 
participating in SAARC was, apart from gaining the goodwill of the smaller countries, 
was to use it as a forum to embarrass India on Kashmir. Economically, it was more 
interested in cultivating its relationship with the Middle East and Gulf countries, which 
had become a vital source of trade, remittance, foreign assistance and subventional oil 
supplies. It also used the “Islamic card” to have closer relationship with Iran, Turkey 
and Central Asian Republics in “ECO”, an organisation which had fallen into disuse 
after the overthrow of the Shah in Iran. Pakistan has been lukewarm toward SAFTA 
and SAPTA and has continued to drag its feet on the issue of MFN to India. Although, 
the official version has been that Pakistan would change its stance only after the 
Kashmir issue was solved or at least some progress made in that direction, the real 
reasons are economic and its apprehension that India as the strident economic power in 
the region will sweep its markets and result in a massive trade deficit and perhaps in 
de-industrialisation of its already fragile economy. 
Other smaller countries also share the apprehension that India  being the 
largest economy in the region,  is likely to receive a disproportionately high share of 
any gain accruing from regional cooperation.   These fears are not without substance, 
but are often exaggerated by those industries and sectors in the economy who  are 
likely to lose, while the potential beneficiaries, by far the more dynamic elements in 
the economy who have been denied patronage and access to resources, have little 
voice in policy formulation. The main thing to recognise is that while there are likely 
to be both gainers and losers from increased trade with India and other countries, the 
country is itself  unlikely to be a loser, even if its bilateral trade balance with one or 
some of the countries worsens   and can be  dispelled by giving adequate safeguards 
for any adverse effects caused to the national economy of smaller countries. For 
unless a country is grossly inefficient, growing trade is an increasing and not a zero 
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Increased and diversified trade with new trading markets under the MFN or 
other concessional trade regimes, will no doubt, give rise to the need for some 
restructuring of the domestic economy and refashioning of comparative advantage. 
This is going to be inevitable for Pakistan whose comparative advantage has been 
frozen since its early nationalisation in the 1950s and 1960 in favour of a few basic 
and unspecialised commodities. This pattern of comparative advantage is likely to 
crumble under the weight of more liberalised trade mandated by the WTO.  To try to 
resist such restructuring on the plea that our industries will be swamped by Indian 
goods is counter productive. India does, after all, not have a high competitive edge 
compared to other countries we will be opening our trade to. Under the pressure of 
competition, Pakistan may acquire a better competitive edge and be forced to 
develop market niches in other countries including India, which its industrialists 
have not had any motivation for doing because of a captive domestic market and 
assured markets in low quality exports. 
 
V.  THE COUNTERFACTUAL REALM 
The half-a-century or more of political tensions, including three full-scale 
wars and a near-miss nuclear showdown,  between India and Pakistan have resulted 
in rather dissimilar patterns and pace of development.  What would have been the 
economic and social outcome if the two countries had not adopted such a belligerent 
and isolationist  stance towards each other and had engaged in a modicum  of 
cooperation  and interaction  conducive to making South Asia a more economically 
integrated and dynamic region than it is today?  In other words, what have been the 
opportunities these countries have missed in reaching a higher development 
trajectory, which could be attributed to lack of regional cooperation?  
South Asia’s record of achievements in the economic field are not 
unimpressive, given the large population inhabiting the region and the low levels of 
economic and social development it achieved before independence.  Despite high 
population growth rates, they have achieved significant increases in per capita 
incomes. However, a comparison with the performance of East Asia and China 
shows that the region has performed far below its potential. Even within South Asia 
the performance has been very uneven, both in economic growth and human 
development. Regional cooperation—through exchange of experience and learning 
by doing—could enhance the productivity of lagging countries. The inadequacy of 
investment (as a percentage of GDP), especially in the case of Pakistan and lower 
efficiency of investments in India, underinvestment in social sectors and inadequacy 
of physical infrastructure especially as the region accelerates its growth rate and tries 
to attract Foreign Direct Investment, are examples of some of the areas in which 
regional cooperation could have made a positive difference.  The region could well 
have avoided many of these problems if it had not suffered from continuing political 
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The Governor of Pakistan’s central bank, Dr Ishrat Hussain, in a conference 
in U.S. last year speculated on Pakistan’s “missed opportunities”, especially as a 
result  of “neglect of human development”.
16  If proper attention was given to 
human development and 100 percent literacy achieved,  it would have doubled 
Pakistan’s per capita income to $1000 and its exports would have been $100 
billion, instead of “the paltry $12 billion” at present.  Dr Hussain, however, 
ascribes “both fundamental structural and institutional problems, as well as “poor 
governance” and “frequent changes in political regimes”. He does not mention the 
heavy burden of defence expenditure, which results in lower expenditure on social 
development or the curtailment of trade with India as a possible source of these 
“missed opportunities”. If India and Pakistan had developed trade, economic and 
industrial interdependence, as, for example, Malaysia and Singapore did, the 
outcomes would surely have been very different indeed. But that may be too far-
fetched a contrafactual to reckon with. A more realistic contrafactual  could be 
derived from the recent revival of trade relationship between China and India, 
which has reportedly increased to $10 billion. 
The arms race between India and Pakistan is both a consequence and cause of 
the differential between the rate of GDP growth in the two countries, as well as the 
commitment to regional cooperation. If this differential increases in India’s favour, 
Pakistan would find itself unable to keep up with India in the arms race unless it 
diverts more resources away from economic and social sectors. Although Pakistan’s 
military is in the driver’s seat and has in the past vetoed any civilian proclivity 
towards regional cooperation, this attitude seems to be changing  especially in such 
areas as allowing the building of  the gas pipeline to India from Central Asia and Iran 
and attracting Foreign Direct Investment and may soften its present attitude towards 
a more liberalised trade with India, with adequate safe guards.  
Except for India and Pakistan, the expenditure on defence in South Asia has 
generally been moderate in the past. Before the Tamil Insurgency in Sri Lanka 
twenty years ago, it used to be joked that a journalist asked a prominent political 
figure about the size of his country’s army, to which he replied, “ we had one, but he 
died last year”. Of course, now things are different and the Sri Lankan army has been 
well-equipped to fight the Tamil tigers. The country’s defence expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP at 3.9 percent in 2001 was lower  than Pakistan’s (4.6 percent) 
but considerably higher than  India’s (2.5 percent) in the same year, but thrice as 
high as of the two more populous least developed countries of SAARC, Bangladesh 
and Nepal.   Sri Lanka’s deployment of soldiers per 1000 population was also the 
region’s highest (6.1) followed by Pakistan (4.6), Nepal (2), India (1.18) and 
Bangladesh (0.98). SAARC countries’ total annual defence expenditure in 2001 at 
1993 prices was $17.20 billion (the figure would be at least 10 percent higher in real 
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terms today and almost double in current prices). If even a fraction of this 
expenditure could be reduced, it could give a considerable boost to the achievement 
of social and economic goals in the region.
17  
The higher burden of defence expenditure by India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
translates into their reduced ability to fund other public services. The share of 
defence in the central government expenditure of these countries in 2001 was 14.0, 
23.0 and 14.7 percent, respectively,  while for Bangladesh and Nepal, it is 11.2 and 
6.5 percent only. It is also no accident that the smaller and poorer SAARC countries 
spend  a higher percentage of GDP on health than India and Pakistan. The latter two 
spent only 0.9 percent of their GDP on public health expenditure, whereas 
Bangladesh and Nepal  spend 1.5 and 1.6 percent respectively. As noted by Jean 
Dreze recently, Bangladesh’s human development record now compares more 
favourably than India’s in many fields, in contrast to the situation some ten years 
ago.
18 In its ambition to become a world power and in pursuit of an èlitist 
development strategy, India has gone back on its commitment made in 1947 that it 
would spend 12 percent of its GDP on public health expenditure. Even in the best 
years it has not gone above 3 percent. The infant mortality rate in Bangladesh which 
was higher (151) than in India (144) and Pakistan (139) in 1960, is now lower (51) 
than in  the latter two countries (67) and (84) respectively.  India also has the dubious 
distinction of having the highest number of tuberculosis cases in the world. 
Bangladesh’s success is largely the result of greater activisim by the NGOs in the 
social sector. 
The neglect of social and human development can cost a country dearly in 
terms of long-term development objectives. Empirical studies show that whereas 
there is a weak relationship between economic development and rates of 
improvements in vital measures of development like education, life expectancy, 
child mortality and gender equality, there is a strong positive relationship between 
key social characteristics and the attainment of development defined in the broader 
sense of the term. One study found that a 10 percent increase in the female literacy 
rate reduced child mortality by an equal percentage. Taking developing countries as 
a whole, gains in female education in the 1960-90 period might have accounted for 
as much as a 38 percent decline in infant mortality and a 58 percent drop in the total 
illiteracy rate. On the other hand, despite the low level of GDP per capita in Sri 
Lanka, life expectancy there is as high as 73 years and infant mortality as low as 14. 
Apart from the peace dividend in terms of a reduction of arms race between 
India and Pakistan, there is also a possibility of an “internal peace dividend” which 
India and Pakistan can reap by promoting greater tolerance among various religious 
and ethnic communities. Both countries face serious law and order problems arising 
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from religious and sectarian violence and ethnic strife. Both countries have   
frequently accused each other’s intelligence agencies (RAW and ISI) as being 
implicated in such violence on their soil. A normalisation of relations between the 
two countries can better enable them to deal with the problem of religious 
fundamentalism and the fighting of proxy wars on their territories. 
 
VI.  SAARC: THE WAY FORWARD 
South Asia accounts for nearly 21 percent of the total world population. 
However, its share in the global GDP is less than 2 percent. The region is home to 
the world’s 400m poor, which means nearly 30 percent of the region’s population 
lives below the poverty line. All SAARC countries have a rather low ranking on the 
human development index (HDI), which according to the latest report of the UNDP 
is: The Maldives (84), Sri Lanka (96), India (127), Bhutan (134), Bangladesh (138), 
Nepal (140) and Pakistan (142). The HDI ranking is based on achievements in terms 
of life expectancy, education and real income. The low HDI ranking reflects poorly 
on these vital indicators in the region. 
Trade is an instrument of development. However, SAARC’s trade performance 
is also disappointing. The combined trade of all member countries makes up less than 2 
percent of the total world trade. The region accounts for 1.3 percent of world exports, 1 
percent of global tourism receipts and 1 percent of global FDI inflows. The share of 
South Asia in total Asian exports and imports is merely 3.6 percent and 4.7 percent, 
respectively. The share of India, South Asia’s largest economy, in Asian exports and 
imports is 3 percent and 3.9 percent respectively, while that of Pakistan, the region’s 
second largest economy, is 0.6 percent and 0.8 percent, respectively. 
Not only is global trade volume of SAARC member countries small, intra-
region trade is also low. Intra-SAARC trade in fact accounts for only 3.5 percent of 
the total trade in the region. India accounts for 65-70 percent of the total regional 
trade, however, its trade with other SAARC countries constitutes less than 3 percent 
of its global trade. Of this, Indian exports to the region are nearly 4 percent of its 
total exports, while imports are less than 1 percent of its global imports. 
Pakistan’s share in total South Asian trade is nearly 15 percent. As in case of 
India, intra-SAARC trade of Pakistan is very low. The country’s exports to the 
region are nearly 3 percent of its global exports, and imports are nearly 2 percent of 
its global imports. No SAARC nation is Pakistan’s major trade partner. 
India and Pakistan being the largest trading nations in South Asia, intra-
SAARC trade depends in large measures on their bilateral trade, which, however, is 
very low. From 1996 to 2003, average annual trade between the two countries has 
been around $253m. Of this, the average share of Pakistani exports is $80m and that 
of Indian exports is $173m. India-Pakistan trade is about 1 percent of their global 
trade. Pakistan’s exports to India are 0.70 percent of its global exports while its 
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are 0.37 percent of its global exports, while its imports from Pakistan constitute 
merely 1.38 percent of its global imports. 
Low trade volume between the two countries, however, does not mean that 
there is lack of demand for each other’s goods as both countries have an informal 
trade of about $3bn. 
The poor trade performance of SAARC stands in marked contrast with that of 
the neighbouring regional alliance—Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN). ASEAN accounts for merely 8.4 percent of the total world population. 
However, its share in total world trade is more than 7 percent. ASEAN’s contribution 
to Asia’s total exports and imports is 24.78 percent and 28.2 percent, respectively. 
Intra-ASEAN trade accounts for nearly 30 percent of the global trade of the 10-
member countries. 
Clearly SAARC has not yet delivered on its promise. In order to fulfil the high 
aspirations of its peoples SAARC will need a new strategic vision. It will have to 
change its ways and its structure and will have to make commensurate efforts to 
revitalise itself. SAARC’s new vision, could be seen as a bridge between East Asia, 
rich in its human resources and technology and West and Central Asia, rich in 
natural resources and finance. The SAARC region’s massive human population and 
educated èlites could complement the needs of both the other regions, with India 
overseeing the Eastern flank and Pakistan providing the linkage to West and Central 
Asia. This will help realise the dream of the Asian century alluded to by the 
Pakistani President at the last SAARC Summit. It will also avoid the 
counterproductive competition between India and Pakistan in their respective regions 
of influence, which has often been a mutual diplomatic irritant between the two 
countries. This vision will present a win-win, non-zero-sum situation for all 
concerned. The only downside this vision may entail is the possible fear of smaller 
SAARC countries that a collusion between India and Pakistan—the reverse of the 
present situation and far from probable—may result in some detriment to them.  
India is keen to acquire an access to Central Asia, through Pakistan if 
possible, through more circuitous routes, if necessary. It is significant that recently 
India, Iran, Oman and Russia signed a treaty to construct a ‘north-south transport 
corridor that would allow, when completed, shipping of goods from India’s western 
coast to Europe via Iran and Caspian Sea ports of Russia.
19 The transit of 
merchandise would be faster by 15 to 20 days and cheaper by 15 to 20 percent as 
compared to the traditional route through Suez Canal. Azerbaijan, a central Asian 
state, and several South Asian nations including Singapore have expressed their 
willingness to join the ‘north-south’ transport system. The Russian parliament has 
cleared the treaty by a unanimous vote for ratification and president Putin has put his 
signature of affirmation on it. Russia is planning to invite foreign direct investments 
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of as much as 15 billion dollars for modernisation of the existing facilities and 
building a new cargo terminal at Olya on the Caspian Sea. Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction provides another “window of opportunity” for peaceful collaboration 
among South Asian countries.  
For realising this new strategic vision, SAARC will have to considerably 
broaden its agenda from its present  limited focus. Poverty alleviation, social 
development and trade liberalisation can and should remain the core issues. Among 
other relevant topics to be included in the SAARC agenda can be Information 
Technology, Infrastructure for Regional Integration, Rural Development, Intra-
industrial trade,  international migration and the role of South Asian diaspora in 
promoting the region’s development. India, which is now recognised as a leading 
force in IT, can be more forthcoming in sharing its experience with other countries 
and in helping to reduce the digital divide, both globally and regionally. Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and India have interesting national experiences to share with the rest of 
the region in the fields of rural development, decentralisation,  participation of 
women and micro-credit schemes. 
Among other opportunities for collaboration between India and Pakistan, in 
particular, and South Asian countries, in general, a number of issues relating to 
globalisation, where collective efforts may prove more effective than individual 
country efforts. In particular,  the WTO issues and the ending of MFA provided 
considerable opportunities for active engagement both by Governments and private 
sectors. Another area in which South Asian countries have a vital interest is the issue 
of labour migration, which could substantially benefit the poor. So far,  the West has 
imposed an unequal bargain, in which developing countries must open their markets 
to foreign investment and products while being unable to export labour or many 
categories of products to the developed world. This is not just unfair but irrational as 
well, especially given the greying of populations in Europe, Japan and North 
America. In the next 10 years, South Asian countries must take the lead in pushing 
for easier international labour migration norms and protecting the interests of 
migrant workers. 
Regional cooperation in South Asia is essential for accelerating the growth 
and reducing poverty in the region. The èlitist pattern of development in both India 
and Pakistan has further stood in the way of developing complementarities between 
the two economies. Unless these èlites realise that the self-serving pattern of 
development they have chosen is unsustainable and needs to be changed through 
greater inclusiveness and deployment of public expenditures to socially more useful 
purposes, such as health, there is unlikely to be any real motivation for them to take 
regional cooperation seriously. 
 